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THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT OR THE MODERN 
CRIMINAL AT WORK:  
THE DANGERS OF FACEBOOK FROM YOUR CUBICLE 
Justin Precht 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1986, the United States House of Representatives stated, 
“Computers are rapidly becoming as much a part of American Life as 
the telephone, automobile, typewriter or our everyday transaction at, for 
instance, the supermarket.”1  Accordingly, legislation was needed to 
address the “vast potential for significant criminal activity . . . because 
the criminal justice system [was] ill-equipped to deal with th[e] 
changing technology.”2  Congress responded by enacting the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) of 1986 in order to address security 
concerns arising in conjunction with the rapid growth of computer use. 
Section 1030(a)(2)(C) of the CFAA criminalizes “exceeding 
authorized access” in order “to obtain information from any protected 
computer.”3  Currently, the circuit courts are split on what it means for 
an individual to “exceed authorized access” in disputes between 
employers and former employees arising under employee access 
provisions of the CFAA.4 
This Comment focuses on the circuit courts’ disagreement on what it 
means to “exceed authorized access” in employer–employee disputes.  
Part II examines the legislative history and purpose of the CFAA.  Part 
III examines circuit court decisions that have employed a broad 
interpretation of the CFAA and the “exceeds authorized access” 
language, and those decisions employing a narrow interpretation.  Part 
IV will provide an analysis of the varying interpretations and address 
why the narrow interpretation should be adopted.  Part V concludes this 
Comment and suggests that the rule of lenity requires the narrow 
interpretation, which more accurately reflects the legislative intent in 
enacting the CFAA and adheres to principles of statutory interpretation 
and Constitutional Due Process.  The conclusion further argues that the 
Legislature should amend the CFAA in order to promote certainty and 
uniformity in the law.  
 
 1. H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 4 (1986). 
 2. Id. at 5. 
 3. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
 4. See discussion infra Part III. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Congress passed the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
(CCCA) of 1984.5  The CCCA made it a crime for a person to 
“knowingly access a computer without authorization or having accessed 
a computer with authorization, use[] the opportunity such access 
provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend” in 
order to knowingly use, modify, destroy, or disclose information in, or 
prevent authorized use of, the computer.6  However, the CCCA limited 
this offense to instances where the computer was under the control of 
the federal government.7  Additionally, the CCCA stated that it was not 
an offense to access a computer with authorization and to use “the 
opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such access does 
not extend, if the us[e] of such opportunity consists only of the use of 
the computer.”8 
Section 1030 of Title 18 of the United States Code was amended in 
1986 to create the CFAA.  Congress specifically cited that one of the 
purposes for the amendment was to address a new breed of criminal 
born out of recent technological advancements: “the technologically 
sophisticated criminal who breaks into computerized data files.”9  The 
amendment  also addressed the lack of legislation regarding theft or 
damage to computers, as federal enforcement previously relied on prior 
legislation “designed for other offenses such as mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 
1341) or wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343).”10  The 1986 amendment 
remained limited to acts affecting federal government computers, but it 
expanded the CFAA to make it a criminal offense to “knowingly access 
a computer without authorization or to exceed authorized access.”11   
The CFAA remained limited until Congress passed the Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA).  The EEA was created, in part, because 
“[t]he United States produce[d] the vast majority of the intellectual 
property in the world” and “[t]he value of the information [was] almost 
entirely dependent on its being a closely held secret.”12   
 
 5. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 
§ 2101, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190-92 (1984). 
 6. Id. at 2190. 
 7. Id. at 2191.  Section (a)(3) made it a crime where the computer “is operated for or on behalf 
of the Government of the United States and such conduct affects such operation.” 
 8. Id. 
 9. H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, supra note 1, at 3. 
 10. Id. at 4. 
 11. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986) 
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). 
 12. S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 6 (1996). 
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This material is a prime target for theft precisely because it costs so much 
to develop independently, because it is so valuable, and because there are 
virtually no penalties for its theft.  The information is pilfered by a variety 
of people and organizations for a variety of reasons.  A great deal of the 
theft is committed by disgruntled individuals or employees who hope to 
harm their former company or line their own pockets.  In other instances, 
outsiders target a company and systematically infiltrate the company then 
steal its vital information.  More disturbingly, there is considerable 
evidence that foreign governments are using their espionage capabilities 
against American companies.13 
At that time, federal law was insufficient to protect a company’s 
valuable information and Congress acknowledged concerns with both 
employee and outsider espionage.  The reach of the CFAA was 
expanded substantially by criminalizing the procurement of 
“information from any protected computer if the conduct involved an 
interstate or foreign communication.”14  Thus, by 1996 the CFAA 
protected a company’s proprietary information and could be used in 
actions by private employers against their employees.  In short, the 1986 
amendment was responsible for broadening the language of the statute 
to cover instances where a person “exceeds authorized access,” and the 
1996 amendment substantially broadened the scope beyond mere misuse 
of government owned computers.15   
The current CFAA, as amended in 2008, makes it a crime under 
Section 1030(a)(2)(C) when an individual “intentionally accesses a 
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access” to obtain 
“information from any protected computer.”16  Similarly, Section 
1030(a)(4) states that it is a crime when someone “knowingly and with 
intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, 
or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the 
intended fraud and obtains anything of value.”17  The CFAA defines 
“exceeds authorized access” in Section 1030(e)(6) as accessing “a 
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter 
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain 
or alter.”18  Section 1030(g) allows an individual “who suffers damage 
or loss” as a result of a violation to “maintain a civil action against the 
violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).  
 15. The CFAA was further amended in 2001 and 2002; however, these amendments did not 
substantially alter the scope as to the provisions discussed in this Comment.   
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
3
Precht: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act or the Modern Criminal at Work:
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014
362 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82 
equitable relief.”19 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The circuits are split on how to interpret the “exceeds authorized 
access” language of the CFAA.  The Seventh, Fifth, First, and Eleventh 
Circuits have utilized a broad interpretation.  The Seventh Circuit 
employs an agency approach, while the Fifth, First, and Eleventh 
Circuits limit authorized access to access authorized by the employer, so 
an employee may have physical access to a computer, but is limited in 
the ways he can use the information on that computer.  The Ninth and 
Fourth Circuits, utilizing the narrow interpretation, have limited 
“exceeds authorized access” to activities synonymous with hacking.  
A. Broad Interpretation of “Exceeds Authorized Access” 
The Seventh Circuit addressed the CFAA’s “exceeds authorized 
access” language in International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin.  The 
defendant was a former employee of International Airport Centers (IAC) 
who, prior to quitting to start his own business, deleted all of the data on 
the laptop that IAC had provided him, which included not only 
information he had been collecting during the course of his employment 
but also evidence of his improper conduct.20  The Seventh Circuit 
applied agency principles and held the defendant breached his duty of 
loyalty when he acted on interests that were adverse to those of his 
employer, namely breaching his employment contract to pursue his own 
business.21  The breach of the duty of loyalty “terminated his agency 
relationship . . . and with it his authority to access the laptop, because 
the only basis of his authority had been that relationship.”22  Thus, the 
defendant “exceeded authorized access” when, no longer an agent of 
IAC, he accessed the laptop in his possession and “used such access to 
obtain or alter information in the computer” that he was “not entitled so 
to obtain or alter.”23   
The Seventh Circuit’s agency approach to “exceeding authorized 
access” made little effort to determine the legislative intent behind the 
CFAA or to provide a solid definition of “exceeds authorized access.”  
Rather, the Seventh Circuit glossed over the “exceeds authorized 
access” issue and transposed common law agency principles onto the 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2006).   
 21. Id. at 420–21. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012). 
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criminal statute to determine that an individual “exceeds authorized 
access” whenever acting on an interest adverse to that of her employer.   
The Fifth Circuit similarly advocated for a broad interpretation of 
“exceeds authorized access.”  However, counter to the Seventh Circuit’s 
agency rationale, the Fifth Circuit held that “exceeding authorized 
access” includes exceeding the purposes for which the employer 
authorizes access.24  In United States v. John, the defendant was an 
account manager at Citigroup who accessed seventy-six corporate 
customer accounts and provided the information to her half-brother.25  
Her half-brother and his accomplices then incurred fraudulent charges 
on some of the accounts.26  The court stated that an employee could 
“exceed authorized access” where the employee exceeds “the purposes 
for which access has been given.”27  The court reasoned that John’s 
access to Citigroup’s data was confined because “[s]he was not 
authorized to access that information for any and all purposes but for 
limited purposes.”28  The government had shown that “Citigroup’s 
official policy, which was reiterated in training programs that John 
attended, prohibited misuse of the company’s internal computer systems 
and confidential customer information,” so John’s authorized access did 
not extend to using the information to perpetuate fraud.29  Thus, under 
the broad interpretation an employee violates the CFAA and exceeds his 
authorized access on a protected computer through activities outside of 
the scope of employer designated access.   
The Fifth Circuit held that finding the CFAA to include authorized 
data the employee did not have access to or information used in carrying 
out a criminally fraudulent scheme would not in any way be surprising 
to the defendant.30  This broad interpretation of the CFAA sets the level 
of authorization only so far as the bounds authorized by an employer 
and notes it is especially applicable where an employee is clearly part of 
a fraudulent scheme.31  The rationale was that John knew she was aiding 
in the commission of a crime and knew that she was “exceeding 
authorized access” such that it would be fair to punish her under the 
statute. 
The First Circuit also held in EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, 
Inc. that access in the “exceeds authorized access” language was to be 
 
 24. United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 25. Id. at 269. 
 26. Id.   
 27. Id. at 272. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 271–73. 
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determined by the employer.  Explorica was a competitor of EF Cultural 
Travel BV (EF) in providing high school tours, and Explorica’s vice 
president, Gormley, was a prior employee of EF.32  Explorica designed 
and used a “scraper” program that focused solely on EF’s website and 
would transfer its pricing information for tours back to Explorica.33  The 
court held that Gormley exceeded authorized access where he entered 
into a broad confidentiality agreement which “prohibit[ed the] 
disclosure of any information ‘which might reasonably be construed to 
be contrary to the interests of EF.’”34  In providing Explorica proprietary 
information about the structure of EF’s website and its tour coding 
system, Gormley exceeded his authorized access as defined by the 
confidentiality agreement.35  Thus, the First Circuit held for the broad 
interpretation and limited authorized access to authorization the 
employer expressly allowed.   
The Eleventh Circuit held that an employee had exceeded authorized 
access when he accessed the personal records of seventeen individuals 
for personal reasons in violation of company policy in United States v. 
Rodriguez.36  Rodriguez worked as a TeleService representative for the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) where he had access to social 
security numbers, annual income, and other personal information.37  
While employed, Rodriguez would look up women he had met or 
knew.38  The court stated that, since the policy of the SSA only 
authorized the use of the databases for business reasons, Rodriguez 
“exceeded authorized access” when he began looking up women for 
personal reasons.39  Therefore, the Rodriguez decision also linked 
authorized access to that allowed under express company policy.   
B. Narrow Interpretation of “Exceeds Authorized Access” 
Other courts, led by the Ninth Circuit, have rejected the broad 
interpretation and adhere to a narrow interpretation of the CFAA that 
refuses to criminalize violations of employer computer use policies.  In 
 
 32. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 33. Id.  The Court noted that “[l]ike a robot, the scraper sought information through the Internet.  
Unlike other robots, however, the scraper focused solely on EF’s website, using information that other 
robots would not have.  Specifically, [Explorica] utilized tour codes whose significance was not readily 
understandable to the public.  With the tour codes, the scraper accessed EF’s website repeatedly and 
easily obtained pricing information for those specific tours.”  
 34. Id. at 583. 
 35. Id. 
 36. United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 37. Id. at 1260. 
 38. Id. at 1261–62. 
 39. Id. at 1263. 
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LVRC Holdings L.L.C. v. Brekka, an employee at an addiction treatment 
center accessed and emailed company records from his employee email 
to his personal email.40  The Ninth Circuit began its analysis stating 
“[t]he act was originally designed to target hackers who accessed 
computers to steal information or to disrupt or destroy computer 
functionality, as well as criminals who possessed the capacity to ‘access 
and control high technology processes vital to our everyday lives.’”41  
The court then rejected the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on agency 
principles in Citrin, determining that the agency approach would mean 
that an employee “exceeds authorized access” once his mental state 
changes from loyal employee to disloyal competitor.”42  More 
importantly, the court reasoned that since section 1030(a) of the CFAA 
is primarily a criminal statute, “any ambiguity should be resolved in the 
favor of lenity.”43   
The rule of lenity “vindicates the fundamental principle that no 
citizen should be held accountable for a violation of a statute whose 
commands are uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not clearly 
prescribed.”44  Thus, where an “employer has not rescinded the 
defendant’s right to use the computer, the defendant would have no 
reason to know that making personal use of the company computer in 
breach of a state law fiduciary duty to an employer would constitute a 
criminal violation of the CFAA.”45  The court held that a person 
“exceeds authorized access” when the person uses a computer either 
without permission to use the computer for any purpose, like a hacker, 
or when the employer rescinds permission to access the computer.46  In 
so holding, the court adopted the narrow interpretation of the “exceeds 
authorized access” language in the CFAA.  
A later Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Nosal, furthered the 
narrow interpretation of the “exceeds authorized access” language in the 
CFAA.  The case wavered between the broad and narrow interpretations 
as it wound its way through the system before the Ninth Circuit, sitting 
en banc, concluded the narrow interpretation was correct.  Nosal was an 
employee at Korn/Ferry International (KFI), which provided executive 
recruitment services.47  Nosal left to start a rival company, signed a 
separation agreement, and agreed to serve as an independent contractor 
 
 40. LVRC Holdings L.L.C. v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 41. Id. at 1130  (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 98-894, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3694 (July 24, 1984)). 
 42. Id. at 1134. 
 43. Id. (quoting United States v. Carr, 513 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir.2008)).  
 44. Id. at 1134–35 (citing United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008)).  
 45. Id. at 1135.  
 46. Id. 
 47. United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *1 (N.D. Cal. April 13, 
2009).  
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to KFI for approximately one year.48  In the separation agreement Nosal 
agreed not to compete with KFI in exchange for $25,000 per month as 
well as two lump-sum payments.49  However, during this period Nosal, 
along with two coworkers, obtained “source lists and other custom 
reports of names and contact information from the KFI ‘Searcher’ 
database, a highly confidential and proprietary database of executives 
and companies.”50   
In 2009, the District Court for the Northern District of California 
acknowledged both the broad and narrow interpretations of “exceeds 
authorized access” before holding in favor of the broad interpretation.51  
The district court noted that Congress had expanded the scope of the 
CFAA since its enactment and that the rule of lenity was inapplicable 
because the statute was not ambiguous.52  The court relied on the 
Seventh Circuit’s use of agency principles in Citrin in holding that 
Nosal had “exceeded authorized access” in accessing KFI’s database.53   
However, driven by the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Brekka, decided 
after the first Nosal decision, the district court granted reconsideration of 
United States v. Nosal in 2010.  In its reconsideration, the district court 
followed Brekka and found that the broad interpretation was unworkable 
where “the defendant would have no reason to know that making 
personal use of the company computer against the employer’s interest 
would constitute a criminal violation of the CFAA.”54  The district court 
noted that the “Ninth Circuit held that authorization hinges on the 
employer’s conduct—has the employer granted the employee 
permission to access the computer?—not the employee’s state of mind 
when accessing information or documents on the employer’s 
computer.”55  The district court dismissed the CFAA charges and 
remarked that there was “simply no way” to read the definition of 
“exceeds authorized access” to include corporate computer-use 
policies.56 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first focused on the text of the CFAA.  It 
noted that the statute defines “exceeds authorized access” to mean “to 
access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or 
alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at *4–7. 
 52. Id. at *6–7.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at *5 (quoting LVRC Holdings L.L.C. v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 55. Id. (quoting Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133). 
 56. Id. at *7. 
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obtain or alter.”57  The government argued, and the court accepted, that 
the narrow interpretation of “exceeds authorized access” made “so” 
superfluous in its definition.58  The court held that the proper 
interpretation should be, “when the employee uses that authorized 
access ‘to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is 
not entitled [in that manner] to obtain or alter.’”59  The Ninth Circuit 
emphasized that “[w]e decline to render meaningless a word duly 
enacted by Congress.”60  After justifying the broad interpretation on the 
statute’s plain language, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Brekka on its 
absence of access restrictions.  However, the court stated that “[o]ur 
decision today that an employer’s use restrictions define whether an 
employee ‘exceeds authorized access’ is simply an application of 
Brekka’s reasoning.”61  The Ninth Circuit also looked to the decisions of 
the Fifth Circuit in John, the Eleventh Circuit in Rodriguez, and the First 
Circuit in Explorica for support of its new position.62   
This decision could have ended the circuit split on the “exceeds 
authorized access” language and designated Brekka as applying only 
when there was no employee policy in place.  However, the Ninth 
Circuit was not finished with this case and granted a rehearing en banc 
in 2012.  The court made clear that they were deciding between two 
very different approaches to the CFAA:   
This language can be read either of two ways: [f]irst, as Nosal suggests 
and the district court held, it could refer to someone who’s authorized to 
access only certain data or files but accesses unauthorized data or files—
what is colloquially known as “hacking.”  For example, assume an 
employee is permitted to access only product information on the 
company’s computer but accesses customer data: [h]e would “exceed [ ] 
authorized access” if he looks at the customer lists.  Second, as the 
government proposes, the language could refer to someone who has 
unrestricted physical access to a computer, but is limited in the use to 
which he can put the information.  For example, an employee may be 
authorized to access customer lists in order to do his job but not to send 
them to a competitor.63  
The court then acknowledged, but rejected, the government’s statutory 
 
 57. United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 58. Id. at 785.  
 59. Id. at 786–87. 
 60. Id. at 786 (citing Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (“[O]ne of the most basic 
interpretive canons [is] that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so 
that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” (internal quotation marks and 
alteration omitted)).  
 61. Id. at 787. 
 62. Id. at 788. 
 63. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).  
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argument that “entitled” should be interpreted in line with the dictionary 
definition of “to furnish with a right.”64  The court said the better 
interpretation is to simply treat “entitled” as a synonym for 
“authorized.”65  The Ninth Circuit then rejected the government’s “so” 
argument because of concerns that adopting such a definition would 
transform the CFAA from an anti-hacking statute to an expansive 
misappropriation statute all because of a “two-letter word that is 
essentially a conjunction.”66  The Circuit court stated that “[i]f Congress 
meant to expand the scope of criminal liability to everyone who uses a 
computer in violation of computer use restrictions—which may well 
include everyone who uses a computer—we would expect it to use 
language better suited to that purpose.”67  A major concern justifying the 
court’s decision was the expansive scope of the broad interpretation. 
The court acknowledged that Congress passed the initial version of 
the CFAA in 1984 for the express purpose of combating hackers.68  The 
government contended that because “without access” applies to hackers, 
the “exceeds authorized access” provision must apply to people who 
have authorized access but exceed it.69  The court stated that both 
provisions could apply to hackers, “without access” for external hackers 
and “exceeds authorized access” for internal hackers.70  The Ninth 
Circuit expressed further concern in making criminals of people who 
would have no idea they are committing a federal crime.71  The court 
stated that “while ignorance of the law is no excuse, we can properly be 
skeptical as to whether Congress, in 1984, meant to criminalize conduct 
beyond that which is inherently wrongful, such as breaking into a 
computer.”72 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s interpretation 
because of its breadth in regards to subsection 1030(a)(2)(C), “which 
[would] make[] it a crime to exceed authorized access of a computer 
connected to the internet without any culpable intent.”73  Under “the 
government’s proposed interpretation, millions of unsuspecting 
individuals would find that they are engaging in criminal conduct.”74  
Instead, the Ninth Circuit invoked common sense: 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 858.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 859. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
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Minds have wandered since the beginning of time and the computer gives 
employees new ways to procrastinate, by g-chatting with friends, playing 
games, shopping or watching sports highlights.  Such activities are 
routinely prohibited by many computer-use policies, although employees 
are seldom disciplined for occasional use of work computers for personal 
purposes.  Nevertheless, under the broad interpretation of the CFAA, 
such minor dalliances would become federal crimes.  While it’s unlikely 
that you’ll be prosecuted for watching Reason.TV on your work 
computer, you could be.  Employers wanting to rid themselves of 
troublesome employees without following proper procedures could 
threaten to report them to the FBI unless they quit.  Ubiquitous, seldom-
prosecuted crimes invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.75 
Therefore, in Nosal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Brekka’s core holding 
and kept the circuit split alive by adopting the narrow interpretation of 
the CFAA.  The Ninth Circuit was clearly uncomfortable in expanding 
the statute, originally designed to punish hacking, into one that could 
potentially cover any employee conduct outside the scope of an 
employer policy.  
The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in WEC Carolina Energy 
Solutions L.L.C. v. Miller  followed the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision 
in Nosal.  In Miller, an employee left WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, 
Inc. (WEC) for its competitor Arc Energy Services, Inc. (Arc).76  Before 
leaving, the employee downloaded and used WEC’s proprietary 
information to make presentations to potential customers.  The court 
acknowledged that the “crux of the issue is the scope of . . . ‘exceeds 
authorized access.’”77  The court followed Brekka and Nosal and held 
that it must interpret the ambiguous statute using the rule of lenity.  “[I]n 
the interest of providing fair warning ‘of what the law intends to do if a 
certain line is passed’ we will construe this criminal statute strictly and 
avoid interpretations not ‘clearly warranted by the text.’”78  The court 
also used the dictionary definition of access which meant “[t]o obtain, 
acquire,” or “[t]o gain admission to.”79  The Fourth Circuit committed to 
the narrow interpretation and clearly held: “we reject an interpretation of 
the CFAA that imposes liability on employees who violate a use policy, 
choosing instead to limit such liability to individuals who access 
computers without authorization or who obtain or alter information 
beyond the bounds of their authorized access.”80 
Other courts are also following the Ninth Circuit’s lead in adopting 
 
 75. Id. at 860.  
 76. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions L.L.C. v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 200 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 77. Id. at 203. 
 78. Id. at 204 (citations omitted). 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 207. 
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the narrow interpretation of the CFAA.  For example, the District Court 
for the Western District of Michigan decided Dana Ltd. v. American 
Axle & Manufacture Holdings, Inc. in June 2012.  The court noted that 
“[t]he Sixth Circuit has not squarely addressed the meaning of ‘without 
authorization’ or ‘exceeds authorized access’ in the context of departing 
employees.”81  Yet, the court, reasoned that a prior Sixth Circuit 
decision, which relied on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brekka, 
suggested that the Sixth Circuit would likewise adopt the narrow view.82  
The court acknowledged Nosal and other decisions of district courts 
within the Sixth Circuit and concluded the “[c]ourt agrees with the 
rationale of the district courts in this circuit, and joins these courts in 
concluding that the terms ‘without authorization’ and ‘exceeds 
authorized access’ in the CFAA must be given a narrow meaning.”83 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The narrow interpretation of the “exceeds authorized access” 
language should be adopted for a number of reasons.  First, the 
legislative history of the CFAA indicates that Congress intended 
“exceeds authorized access” to combat hacking.  Second, the rule of 
lenity requires any ambiguity to be resolved in favor of the party 
accused of violating the law where the CFAA could potentially attach 
criminal liability.  Third, constitutional due process concerns support a 
narrow interpretation of the statute.  Finally, practicality and efficiency 
dictate limiting the use of the criminal statute in employer–employee 
disputes.  
A.  Congressional Intent 
The House of Representatives Committee Report on the 1986 version 
of the CFAA stated in a section titled “Need for Legislation:” 
One somewhat unique aspect of computer crime is the expanding group 
of electronic trespassers—the so called ‘hackers’ who have been 
frequently glamorized by the media, perhaps because this image of the 
hacker is that of a bright, intellectually curious, and rebellious youth—a 
modern day Huck Finn.  The fact is, these young thrill seekers are 
trespassers, just as much as if they broke a window and crawled into a 
home while the occupants were away.  The Committee believes we 
should attempt to deter and educate these youths in order to prevent our 
 
 81. Dana Ltd. v. Am. Axle & Mfg. Holdings, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-450, 2012 WL 2524008, at *4 
(W.D. Mich. June 29, 2012). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at *5. 
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hacker of today from becoming our white-collar criminal of the future.84 
The legislative intent for the initial version of the CFAA was to combat 
the rise of hackers.  In fact, the Committee Report’s “Need for 
Legislation” focused primarily on two themes with almost equal 
recognition: the rapid growth of computer technology in everyday life 
and hackers.85   
The Senate Committee Report addressed the same concerns: 
Th[e] technological explosion has made the computer a mainstay of our 
communications system, and it has brought a great many benefits to the 
government, to American businesses, and to all of our lives.  But it has 
also created a new type of criminal—one who uses computers to steal, to 
defraud, and to abuse the property of others.  The proliferation of 
computers and computer data has spread before the nation’s criminals a 
vast array of property that, in many cases, is wholly unprotected against 
crime.86 
 The Senate Report then noted a group of hackers known as the “414 
Gang,” who had hacked the radiation treatment records of cancer 
patients.87  The report stated, “the potentially life-threatening nature of 
such mischief is a source of serious concern to the Committee.”88  The 
Senate Report then acknowledged “pirate bulletin boards,” also 
mentioned extensively in the House Report, which were a community 
system of computers accessed via phone that had computer passwords 
and other vital information.89  These concerns suggest that the 
legislative intent behind the 1986 CFAA was to prevent harm caused by 
the sophisticated hacker. 
Furthermore, the 1996 EEA opened the CFAA beyond only those 
offenses against United States government owned computers.  This 
version of the CFAA protected “information from any protected 
computer if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign 
communication.”90  The Senate Committee Report stated:  
Only by adopting a national scheme to protect U.S. proprietary economic 
information can we hope to maintain our industrial and economic edge 
and thus safeguard our national security.  Foremost, we believe that the 
greatest benefit of the Federal statute will be as a powerful deterrent.  In 
addition, a Federal criminal law is needed because of the international 
and interstate nature of this activity, because of the sophisticated 
 
 84. H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, supra note 1, at 5–6.  
 85. Id. at 4–6. 
 86. S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 2 (1986). 
 87. Id. at 2–3. 
 88. Id. at 3. 
 89. Id.  
 90. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
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techniques used to steal proprietary economic information, and because 
of the national implications of the theft.91 
The Report in its section titled “Increasing Incidents of Theft of 
Proprietary Economic Information” noted that “computer 
intrusions . . . account for the largest portion of economic and industrial 
information lost by U.S. corporations.  Most American companies are 
poorly prepared to deal with these sophisticated and coordinated efforts 
to obtain their proprietary economic information.”92  Thus, the 1996 
Senate Report also focused clearly on international hackers’ access to 
vulnerable information.   
Furthermore, the 1996 Committee Report addressed the rise of 
internal theft.  One example the Report addressed was “an engineer for 
an automobile air bag manufacturer who asked the company’s 
competition for more than half a million dollars” for a “laundry list” of 
“manufacturing designs, strategies, and plans.”93  Another was a 
“former employee of two major computer companies” who stole “vital 
information on the manufacture of microchips” and sold it “to China, 
Cuba, and Iran.”94   
All of the above Committee Reports addressed actions are covered by 
the narrow interpretation of the CFAA’s “exceeds authorized access” 
language.  Clearly hacking and foreign and internal espionage represent 
something more serious than actions that are merely beyond an express 
employer computer use policy.  The legislative history acknowledges 
the threat of hacking and advanced espionage, but is lacking on actions 
like deleting the information on a work laptop seen in Citrin or using a 
work database to look at information for personal reasons in 
Rodriguez.95  
The legislative intent argument is not addressed in the circuit court 
opinions adhering to the broad interpretation.  However, legislative 
intent is raised by the Fourth Circuit in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions: 
Our conclusion here likely will disappoint employers hoping for a means 
to rein in rogue employees.  But we are unwilling to contravene 
Congress’s intent by transforming a statute meant to target hackers into a 
vehicle for imputing liability to workers who access computers or 
 
 91. S. REP. NO. 104-359, supra note 12, at 11–12. 
 92. Id. at 8. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 8–9.  
 95. See id. at 7–9; Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2006) (an 
employee who upon terminating his employment wiped his work laptop); and United States v. 
Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010) (a Social Security Administration employee who used 
his work access to spy on female acquaintances).  
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information in bad faith, or who disregard a use policy.96 
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit raised the issue in Nosal stating that the 
“narrower interpretation” was “a more sensible reading of the text and 
legislative history of a statute whose general purpose is to punish 
hacking—the circumvention of technological access barriers—not 
misappropriation of trade secrets—a subject Congress has dealt with 
elsewhere.”97 
The Committee Reports for the multiple amendments to the CFAA 
support a narrow interpretation limited to hacking as seen in the Ninth 
and Fourth Circuit cases.  The legislative intent argument is compelling 
because the 1986 Reports specifically mentioned hacking as a major 
impetus for the legislation.98  Likewise, the 1996 Report focused on 
foreign and internal espionage.99  There is some room for movement in 
the legislative intent argument, since the Report does not give internal 
espionage a clearly defined scope.100  However, the Report does provide 
sufficiently egregious examples to differentiate the intent of the statute 
from the broad holdings of the Seventh, Fifth, First, and Eleventh 
Circuits.101  
B. Rule of Lenity 
Ambiguity concerning the scope of criminal statutes should be 
resolved in favor of lenity, meaning any doubts about an ambiguous 
statute should be resolved in favor of the defendant.102  In United 
States v. Bass the Supreme Court stated that the “choice has to be made 
between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is 
appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that 
Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.”103   
There are two principles behind the rule of lenity:  
First, ‘a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the 
 
 96. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions L.L.C. v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 97. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 98. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, supra note 1, at 5–6; S. REP. NO. 99-432, supra note 86. 
 99. See generally S. REP. NO. 104-359, supra note 12. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id.  The Report notes an engineer who stole manufacturing designs and plans who sold the 
information to company competition for half a million dollars; an employee for two major computer 
companies who sold information to China, Cuba and Iran; and an employee who worked at a computer 
firm that supplied software technology to various government projects like NASA who transmitted the 
source code to another person. 
 102. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971); United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 
(2008).  
 103. Bass, 404 U.S. at 347 (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 
221–22 (1952)). 
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common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain 
line is passed.  To make the warning fair, so fair as possible the line 
should be clear.’ Second, because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, 
and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral 
condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define 
criminal activity.104 
 The rule of lenity is a strong argument for the narrow interpretation of 
the CFAA statute for “exceeds authorized access.”105  The CFAA 
attaches a criminal penalty where a person “intentionally accesses a 
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and 
thereby obtains . . . information from any protected computer.”106  The 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits first found the statute ambiguous by relying 
on legislative intent and the plain meaning interpretation, and then 
applied the rule of lenity as support for adopting the narrow 
interpretation of the statute. 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned: 
The government’s construction of the statute would expand its scope far 
beyond computer hacking to criminalize any unauthorized use of 
information obtained from a computer.  This would make criminals of 
large groups of people who would have little reason to suspect they are 
committing a federal crime.  While ignorance of the law is no excuse, we 
can properly be skeptical as to whether Congress, in 1984, meant to 
criminalize conduct beyond that which is inherently wrongful, such as 
breaking into a computer.107 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit stated that section 1030(a)(2)(C), the 
section that primarily comes up in employee–employer disputes, is the 
broadest subsection and “makes it a crime to exceed authorized access 
of a computer connected to the Internet without any culpable intent.  
Were we to adopt the government’s proposed interpretation, millions of 
unsuspecting individuals would find that they are engaging in criminal 
conduct.”108 
The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that “employer–employee and 
company–consumer relationships are traditionally governed by tort and 
contract law,” and “the government’s proposed interpretation of the 
 
 104. Id. at 348 (citations omitted). 
 105. But see Matthew Kapitanyan, Beyond WarGames: How the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Should be Interpreted in the Employment Context, 7 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 405, 449 (2012) 
(citing Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2423–24 (2006) (collecting cases)) 
(noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has increasingly watered down its formulation of the lenity rule, 
applying it only in the face of ‘grievous ambiguity,’ or only if ‘after seizing everything from which aid 
can be derived,’ the Court can make ‘no more than a guess as to what Congress intended’”).   
 106. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). 
 107. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 108. Id. 
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CFAA allows private parties to manipulate their computer-use and 
personnel policies so as to turn these relationships into ones policed by 
the criminal law.”109  Furthermore, “[b]asing criminal liability on 
violations of private computer use polices can transform whole 
categories of otherwise innocuous behavior into federal crimes simply 
because a computer is involved.”110 
The Fourth Circuit also applied the rule of lenity in adopting the 
narrow interpretation of “exceeds authorized access:” 
Thus, faced with the option of two interpretations, we yield to the rule of 
lenity and choose the more obliging route . . . .  Here, Congress has not 
clearly criminalized obtaining or altering information “in a manner” that 
is not authorized.  Rather, it has simply criminalized obtaining or altering 
information that an individual lacked authorization to obtain or alter.111 
The two circuits that adopted the narrow interpretation applied the rule 
of lenity because the statute was ambiguous.  One reason criminal 
liability need not attach to the ambiguous statute, per the Fourth Circuit, 
was because “nine other state-law causes of action potentially provide 
relief, including conversion, tortious interference with contractual 
relations, civil conspiracy, and misappropriation of trade secrets.”112  
The rule of lenity is especially applicable where the potential criminal 
liability subsumes so much seemingly innocuous daily activity. 
C. Constitutional Due Process Concerns 
A law may fail to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause 
“if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to 
the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, 
without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in 
each particular case.”113  Thus, “[v]agueness may invalidate a criminal 
law for either of two independent reasons.  First, it may fail to provide 
the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what 
conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”114 
The broad interpretation of the CFAA’s “exceed authorized access” 
language might violate both elements of the void-for-vagueness 
 
 109. Id. at 860. 
 110. Id. 
 111. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions L.L.C. v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 112. Id. at 207 n.4. 
 113. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402–03 (1966). 
 114. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999). 
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doctrine.115  It is highly unlikely that employees in the workforce are 
aware they are potentially violating federal law when they spend a small 
portion of their time at the office casually browsing the internet.  
Whether or not such access would be considered a federal criminal 
infraction would depend on the state and the employer’s acceptable use 
policy.  The CFAA, a criminal law, fails to provide adequate notice of 
liability to otherwise reasonable, law-abiding citizens.  “Significant 
notice problems arise if we allow criminal liability to turn on the 
vagaries of private polices that are lengthy, opaque, subject to change 
and seldom read.”116  A criminal statute that includes seemingly 
harmless, everyday activity is vague in that it surprises ordinary people.   
In addition, the interpretation that relies on computer-use policy is 
also likely overbroad, in that arbitrary enforcement necessarily follows a 
statute that potentially criminalizes daily activity.117  The Ninth Circuit 
in Nosal discussed United States v. Kozminski, in which the Supreme 
Court refused to adopt the broad interpretation of a statute because it 
would “criminalize a broad range of day-to-day activity.”118  In 
Kozminski, the Court applied the rule of lenity and cautioned that the 
broader statutory interpretation would “delegate to prosecutors and 
juries the inherently legislative task of determining what type 
of . . . activities are so morally reprehensible that they should be 
punished as crimes,” subjecting individuals to discriminatory and 
arbitrary enforcement.119  The broad interpretation of the CFAA is no 
different.  The government argued in Nosal that it would not prosecute 
minor crimes under the broad interpretation of the CFAA.120  However, 
such a concession acknowledges that the law would be so broad as to 
cover activity which need not be considered criminal.  A law, on the 
books, which is enforced against some, but not others, at the discretion 
of government actors is arbitrary. 
 
 115. See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 1561, 1562 (2010), stating “[t]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires courts to adopt narrow and 
clear interpretations of unauthorized access to save the constitutionality of the statute.  The CFAA has 
become so broad, and computers so common, that expansive or uncertain interpretations of unauthorized 
access will render it unconstitutional.” 
 116. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 117. See Cheryl Conner, Employees Really Do Waste Time at Work, FORBES.COM (July 17, 2012, 
4:24 PM),  http://www.forbes.com/sites/cherylsnappconner/2012/07/17/employees-really-do-waste-
time-at-work (discussing a recent survey which estimated 64% of employees visited non-work related 
websites at work). 
 118. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 949 (1988). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862. 
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D. Practicality, Common Sense, and Court Resources 
There are real world implications where employees could potentially 
be held criminally liable for seemingly minor transgressions that occur 
at work within the confines of one’s cubicle.  It is only natural for an 
employee in a nine-to-five career to take a break from his work.  Prior to 
the computer take-over of the office environment, employees may have 
wasted time in extended meetings, making small talk with coworkers, 
getting coffee, or talking on the phone.  Now, with a computer at every 
desk, while an employee may be using the Internet to check his bank 
account or personal email, or pay his bills, or e-mail a friend, it is more 
likely that he will be checking Facebook, Reddit, Tumblr, Twitter, 
Pinterest, LinkedIn, Amazon, or any other number of social media 
sites.121  Many employees are not transfixed solely on work for eight 
straight hours, interrupted by a lunch at noon, when the wealth of 
content on the internet is available by a click of the mouse.  The Internet 
may be the greatest source of distraction and it is ever so close.  Some 
studies show that breaks from work might even be productive, and 
criminalization of productive activity should be discouraged.122   
The Ninth Circuit addressed this argument in Nosal.  Minds wonder, 
and people procrastinate.123  We are not always perfect workers.  
However, many computer use policies prohibit such temporary 
excursions to one’s favorite website or activity that are unrelated to 
work.  Under the broad interpretation of the CFAA, attaching authorized 
access only as far as the employer allows in its computer use policies, 
these miniscule misdeeds would be classified as federal crimes.  Also, 
linking authorized access to employee computer use policies is 
problematic because it will always be arbitrary.  While it is not likely 
that such a crime would be enforced, it is possible.  The CFAA 
interpretation that casts such a wide net to include common conduct in 
 
 121. Conner, supra note 117. 
 122. There are a number of studies on the subject and the conclusions differ, but some suggest 
that breaks are a good thing.  See Brief Diversions Vastly Improve Focus, Researchers Find, 
SCIENCEDAILY (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/02/110208131529.htm 
(noting that a new study “overturns a decades-old theory about the nature of attention and demonstrates 
that even brief diversions from a task can dramatically improve one’s ability to focus on that task for 
prolonged periods”).  But see Adam Gorlick, Need a Study Break to Refresh? Maybe Not, Say Stanford 
Researchers, STANFORD REPORT (Oct. 14, 2010), 
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2010/october/willpower-resource-study-101410.html (discussing a paper 
published in Psychological Science by Stanford psychologists that found “a person’s mindset and 
personal beliefs about willpower determine how long and how well they’ll be able to work on a tough 
mental exercise”).  See also Charlotte Fritz, Coffee Breaks Don’t Boost Productivity After All, 
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (May 30, 2012), http://hbr.org/2012/05/coffee-breaks-dont-boost-
productivity-after-all/ar/1.   
 123. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860. 
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the workplace is unworkable.124 
Furthermore, the broad interpretation of the CFAA should also be 
avoided because there are other causes of action for employer–employee 
disputes.  “The CFAA should not create liability in the employment 
context that overlaps or preempts traditional causes of action applying to 
employees.  These tools include, among others, noncompete provisions, 
trade secret protections, conspiracy, contract law, and the duty of 
loyalty.”125  Employer–employee relationships are traditionally 
governed by tort and contract law, and the government’s broad 
interpretation of “exceeds authorized access” would allow employers to 
manipulate their acceptable-use policies to turn the relationship into 
ones policed by the criminal law.126  Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
held that federal laws should only be read to interfere with the balance 
of power between state and federal government only when the 
congressional intent is unmistakably clear.127  The narrow interpretation 
of the CFAA avoids unnecessary federal usurpation of causes of action 
available to employers under state law.   
A broad interpretation of the CFAA also has the potential to create 
absurd results.  Imposing criminal liability on computer use policy 
means that “innocuous behavior” can be turned into a federal crime 
“simply because a computer is involved.”128  For example, an employee 
who brings a Sudoku book into work and solves puzzles during 
downtime would be safe, but another employee who access 
www.websudoku.com, in violation of an employer computer use policy, 
is breaking federal criminal law.129  Likewise, reading a hard copy of 
ESPN: The Magazine or The New York Times is safe, but visiting 
www.espn.com or www.nyt.com is criminal.   
Finally, the broad interpretation of the CFAA could waste scarce 
 
 124. Id. at 862 (discussing Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 949, in which the Supreme Court refused to 
adopt the broad interpretation of a statute because it would “criminalize a broad range of day-to-day 
activity,” and warned that the broader statutory interpretation would “delegate to prosecutors and juries 
the inherently legislative task of determining what type of . . . activities are so morally reprehensible that 
they should be punished as crimes” and “subject individuals to the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory 
prosecution and conviction”).  
 125. Garret D. Urban, Note, Causing Damage Without Authorization: The Limitations of Current 
Judicial Interpretations of Employee Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 52 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1369, 1390 (2011). 
 126. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860. 
 127. Urban, supra note 125, at 1390–91 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 
(1991)). 
 128. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860. 
 129. Id. stating, “Employees who call family members from their work phones will become 
criminals if they send an email instead.  Employees can sneak in the sports section of the New York 
Times to read at work, but they’d better not visit ESPN.com.  And [S]udoku enthusiasts should stick to 
the printed puzzles, because visiting www.dailysudoku.com from their work computers might give them 
more than enough time to hone their [S]udoku skills behind bars.” 
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federal judicial resources.  The broad interpretation relies on computer 
use policies, and any violation could be a potential federal crime.  If all 
of these crimes were pursued, the federal court system would be 
inundated with causes of action under the CFAA. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current circuit split concerning the CFAA’s “exceeds authorized 
access” leads to confusion for lower courts.  Furthermore, the differing 
circuit court interpretations of the CFAA’s authorized access language 
inhibit multistate employers’ ability to create and implement company-
wide comprehensive CFAA policies.130  The Seventh, Fifth, First, and 
Eleventh Circuits have held that the plain language of the CFAA 
supports a broad interpretation of the statute covering the “misuse or 
misappropriation” of protected information.131  The Ninth and Fourth 
Circuits have recently held that the CFAA is ambiguous as to what 
employee conduct “exceeds authorized access” and that the rule of 
lenity should be applied to limit the definition to conduct on par with 
hacking, which coincides with the legislative intent.132  The narrow 
interpretation of the CFAA’s statute is the correct one for employer–
employee disputes because the CFAA is a criminal statute and other 
areas of law already cover the activity to which it ascribes criminal 
liability.  The broad interpretation of the statute casts the net much wider 
than it need or should be.   
In United States v. Nosal, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[t]he 
government assures us that, whatever the scope of the CFAA, it won’t 
prosecute minor violations.”133  However, leaving an unduly broad 
statute on the books is not the correct approach.  The solution to the 
ambiguity should come from either a legislative fix or for the Supreme 
Court of the United States to grant certiorari on a relevant case to 
resolve the dispute.  A statutory fix, however, would be the superior 
option because Congress is capable of amending and clarifying an 
ambiguous statute.  Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick 
Leahy had filed amendments to The Cybersecurity Act of 2012.134  
 
 130. Obie Okuh, Comment, When Circuit Breakers Trip: Resetting the CFAA to Combat Rogue 
Employee Access, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 637, 641 (2011). 
 131. See Int’l Airport Ctrs, L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. John, 
597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 
2001); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010).   
 132. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862; WEC Carolina Energy Solutions L.L.C. v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 
200 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 133. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862. 
 134. Josh Smith, Cybersecurity Bill Hinges on Amendments, NATIONAL JOURNAL (July 30, 2012), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/cybersecurity-bill-hinges-on-amendments-20120730. 
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These amendment would have satisfied the Department of Justice by 
“enhancing the CFAA’s penalties, adding an asset forfeiture provision, 
and creating a new extra-punitive 18 U.S.C. 1030A.”135  In exchange, 
“Leahy’s Amendment would [have applied a] statutory fix to the 
definition of ‘exceeds authorized access’ that essentially adopts the 
narrow view of the circuit split on the scope of the CFAA.”136  
However, the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 was defeated in the Senate.137  
If Congress is not able to amend the statute, the Supreme Court should 
grant certiorari in order to provide clarity and guidance to the lower 
courts. 
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